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Abstract
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) aims to increase com-
petition and to foster client protection in the European nancial market. Among
other provisions, it abolishes the concentration rule and challenges the market power
of existing trading venues. The directive introduces venue competition in order to
achieve better execution and ultimately lower trading costs. In this paper I address
the question of whether fostering competition between alternative trading venues
alone may or not be able to impact actual competition in the market. I consider
two reasons for why it may not: direct network e¤ects together with increasing re-
turns to scale, and post-trading constraints. In particular, I (a) evaluate the actual
degree of competition between trading venues, (b) measure the impact of network
e¤ects on competition, and lastly (c) assess the barriers to competition induced by
post-trading constraints. The results imply that nancial intermediaries tend to
value liquidity more (than total fees) when deciding where to route a given order for
execution - implying that being the incumbent venue translates into a competitive
advantage. Furthermore, eliminating the mentioned barriers to competition seems
to be asociated with a signicant decrease (of a similar magnitude) in the assymetry
of the industry.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The interaction between competition and economic growth is a well established fact in
the literature (Porter (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Blundell et al. (1995), Aghion
et al. (1999)). Competition impacts economic growth via a more e¢ cient allocation of
market resources that contributes to better economic performance, better prices and
better services for consumers and businesses(Kroes (2007)).
The last years have witnessed a strong and ferocious promotion of competition in
a large spectrum of markets and industries and a clear example of this trend is the
new Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) that fosters a fair, competitive,
transparent, e¢ cient and integrated European nancial market.
To this end, MiFID aims - among other objectives - to harmonize the trading struc-
tures across the Member States by abolishing the requirement to concentrate the execu-
tion of trading orders by nancial intermediaries in a single venue.
The above principle challenges the market power of existing venues and fosters en-
try by new players. This paper argues that fostering potential competition in the cash
trading market may not have an impact on the degree of actual competition. In partic-
ular, I consider two reasons for why it may not: (a) direct network e¤ects together with
increasing returns to scale and (b) post-trading constraints.
MiFID determines that the choice of trading venue by nancial intermediaries must
achieve best execution to their clients. Best execution coincides with the venue that
achieves the best price at a lower cost, which means that the choice of nancial inter-
mediaries must take into account not only factors related to the explicit trading costs
(execution, settlement and clearing fees), but also factors connected with the implicit
trading costs (price and liquidity).
Implicit trading costs are important as cash trading exhibits direct network e¤ects.
The valuation of nancial intermediaries for a given trading venue is increasing in the
number of other agents that choose the same venue - as it increases the probability of
an order nd a corresponding counterparty.
This fact raises the problem that in the presence of network e¤ects, fostering com-
petition among alternative trading venues may not be enough. The reason being that
venues with high liquidity - typically the incumbent stock exchanges - present lower im-
plicit trading costs and therefore have a clear advantage relatively to their competitors
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- limiting the extent of e¤ective competition. In order for competitors to succeed, they
need to trade-o¤ this disadvantage with lower explicit trading costs, which for venues
with similar technologies may not possible in an industry characterized with increasing
returns to scale.
The second justication relates to constraints on post-trading services. Di¤erent
trading venues can not considered as e¤ective substitutes if they imply di¤erent post-
trading arrangements - with di¤erent clearing and settlement costs. The competition for
trading venues is limited by the fact that nancial intermediaries can not freely choose
post-trading arrangements.
This paper proposes to empirically address the following questions: (a) evaluate
the actual degree of competition between alternative trading venues, (b) measure the
impact of network e¤ects on competition, and lastly (c) assess the barriers to competition
induced by post-trading constraints. Finally, some economic policy implications are
proposed.
To this end, I suggest a structural discrete-choice multinomial random-coe¢ cients
logit demand model for trading following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) that takes
into account the trade-o¤ between explicit and implicit trading costs following Pagano
(1989). The model is exible in the sense that the implied substitution patterns do not
su¤er from the problem of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property
characteristic of more standard models. Furthermore, following the demand modelling
literature, the error term is structurally embedded in the model and thereby circumvents
the critique provided by Brown and Walker (1989) related to the addition of add-hoc
errors and their induced correlations. The results imply that nancial intermediaries
tend to value liquidity more (than total fees) when deciding where to route a given order
for execution. For this reason the incumbent venue has a clear advantage relatively to
its competitors and can as a result exert market power when setting total fees.
After estimating the degree of substitutability between the di¤erent trading venues,
I analyze the impact of network e¤ects as a barrier to competition, by computing the
counterfactual market shares that would arise if there were no liquidity di¤erences across
venues. Lastly I propose a measure of the barriers to competition induced by the bundle
of trading and post-trading services by simulating the equilibrium market shares that
would arise if the services of di¤erent trading services were fungible. In both cases, the
results suggest that eliminating the corresponding barrier to competition is asociated
with a signicant decrease (of a similar magnitude) in the assymetry of the industry.
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Figure I - The Trading Mechanism
Source: Pagano and Padilla (2005).
The paper proceeds as follows. The economics of trading is described in section 2,
whereas in section 3 I discuss the relevant literature. Section 4 presents the demand
model and establishes estimation issues. In section 5, I introduce the data, discuss
identication and present the results. Section 6 discusses network e¤ects and post-
trading constraints as barriers to competition. Section 7 concludes.
2 THE ECONOMICS OF TRADING AND MiFID
The process of trade starts with investors sending their buying or selling orders to a
broker or a broker-dealer. If investors choose the former, the broker receives the order
and can decide by one of two options: (a) can place it directly on a trading venue order
book or (b) can decide to go indirectly via a dealer. If the broker opts for option (b) or the
investors send their orders directly to a broker-dealer then the dealer (or broker-dealer
depending on the case) can match the order from its own inventory, place the order on
a trading venue or go to another dealer. The process of trading involving an electronic
trading platform is illustrated in Figure I.
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Table I - Market Concentration
Concentration Ratios C1 C3 C5
European Equities 31% 58% 75%
UK Equities 63% 87% 89%
FTSE 100 Equities 70% 98% 99%
Source: Reuters Market Share Reports, November 2007.
The paper focuses on trading venue competition and for that reason models the
choice of venue to execute an order by brokers, dealers and broker-dealers (henceforth
nancial intermediaries).
At rst sight, the market for trading in Europe seems not to be extremely concen-
trated for an industry with strong network e¤ects and scale economies - if you consider
the set of all European securities, the volume market share of the leading trading venue
is roughly 30% with the top 3 venues capturing approximately 60% of the market. How-
ever these statistics are somehow misleading as typically trading for a given security is
concentrated on a smaller set of trading venues. If you consider the set of the FTSE 100
securities, the market share for the leading trading venue is now roughly 70% with the
top 3 venues capturing approximately 98% of the market! Table I presents a range of
concentration ratios for di¤erent sets of European equities.
On this respect, MiFID tries to promote a signicant change in the shape of the
industry. It aims to increase competition by creating a common harmonized Euro-
pean market for nancial products and to foster client protection through improved
transparency, suitability requirements and best execution principles. In particular, it
abolishes the so-called "concentration rule" that allowed, in the past, member states to
impose that securities admitted to trading on a regulated market have to be traded only
on regulated markets. The MiFID allows, in contrast, the provision of trading services
to a variety of trading venues, namely Regulated Markets (RM), Multilateral Trading
Facilities (MTF) and Systematic Internalizers (SI).
RM or MTF are entities that o¤er multilateral trading for nancial instruments (such
as an order book), with slightly di¤erent standards applying to each, whereas SI refer
to nancial rms which, on an organized, frequent and systematic basis, deal on own
account by executing client orders outside a RM or an MTF.
A nancial intermediary wanting to trade a given security is therefore faced with
a choice - it must choose a venue where to route the order from RM like the London
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Figure II - Clearing and Settlement Flows
Source: Carvalho (2004).
Stock Exchange, Euronext or Frankfurt Stock Exchange, MTF like Chi-X, or SI like
ABN AMRO, Goldman Sachs or UBS. Following MiFiD, the chosen venue must achieve
best execution, taking into account a number of factors that include transaction costs,
price and liquidity, speed of execution, likelihood of execution, clearing and settlement
arrangements, etc.
Transaction costs refer to the explicit trading costs of each venue. These costs can be
decomposed into costs of executing an order (trading fees) and post-trade costs (clearing
and settlement fees). Clearance refers to the validation of a trade and the subsequent
establishment of the obligations of the parties to the trade (what each owes and is en-
titled to receive). Settlement is the process during which buyer and seller details are
matched and the security changes ownership against the appropriate payment. Clearing
and settlement services are typically performed by specializing institutions: the transfer
of ownership is carried out by a central securities depository or an international cen-
tral securities depository, whereas the banking/payment system handles the payment of
funds. Figure II presents the ows involved in the clearing and settlement of a trade.
Figure III show the explicit trading costs (and the respective decomposition) faced
by a typical nancial intermediary and it is clear that those vary substantially across
trading venues, not only in absolute terms but also in their composition.
The analysis of the gure may suggest an intriguing question: given that compet-
ing venues have di¤erent explicit trading costs, what prevents trade to concentrate on
the venue which o¤ers the lowest fees? Explicit trading costs are not the only factor
guiding best execution. Price and liquidity are other important factors in achieving best
execution and relate to the implicit trading costs of each venue, which typically include
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Figure III - Decomposition of Explicit Costs per Trade
Source: European Commission (2006). Data refers to 2004.
the bid-ask spread, the potential impact of a trade, and the opportunity cost of missed
trades.
Implicit trading costs are important as cash trading exhibits direct network e¤ects.
Financial intermediarys valuation of a venue is increasing in the number of other agents
that choose the same venue as it reduces the costs of nding a counterparty. A more
liquid venue translates into lower implicit trading costs as it (a) stabilizes the market
price of a nancial instrument, and (b) reduces the extent to which placing an order has
an adverse e¤ect on the corresponding price.
Pagano (1989) shows that if the explicit trading costs are equal across venues, the
direct network e¤ects promote the concentration of trade on only one venue. However,
if the low explicit trading costs of a venue are traded-o¤ against higher implicit trading
costs, multiple trading venues can coexist in equilibrium.
This fact raises the problem that in the presence of network e¤ects, fostering com-
petition among alternative trading venues may not be enough. The reason being that
venues with high liquidity - typically the incumbent stock exchanges - present lower im-
plicit trading costs and therefore have a clear advantage relatively to their competitors
- limiting the extent of e¤ective competition. In order for competitors to succeed, they
need to trade-o¤ this disadvantage with lower explicit trading costs, which for venues
with similar technologies may not possible in an industry characterized with increasing
returns to scale.
Underestimating the importance of network e¤ects can often lead to a dismal fail-
ure. As an illustration consider the case of Jiway, a pan-European trading platform for
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Table II - Average Volume per Order
London Stock Exchange 3,509
Chi-X 1,302
Systematic Internalizers 42,386
Source: Authors calculations, November 2007 - March 2008.
retail investors launched in the last quarter of 2000 by Morgan Stanley and the Swedish
company OM. The two companies invested $100 million on the project that promised
access to 6,000 European securities, but it turned out to be unable to attract liquidity:
in January 2001 it executed 1,996 trades, in February 474 trades, and in March 577
trades. As a result, by the end of 2002, Jiway was shut down.
Another illustration is provided by Chi-X, a multilateral trading facility set up in
the rst quarter of 2007. Chi-X soon understood that if it wanted to successfully attract
trades it needed to balance the high implicit trading costs (due to the low liquidity)
with extremely low explicit trading costs. The solution (up to this moment with very
optimistic results) has been to o¤er a fee schedule that reverses the standard in the
industry and includes, in certain cases, a negative execution fee - corresponding to a
payment from the venue to the intermediary.
In face with a clear disadvantage, alternative competing venues typically avoid direct
competition with the incumbent and specialize in attracting intermediaries with niche
trading proles. Table II presents the average volume per order in reference for the 20
most traded FTSE 100 securities for the top 3 trading venues.
The data suggests that segmentation maybe in fact an issue in this market and as
a result the concentration ratios presented maybe even higher if certain characteristics
of the orders - like size - are taken into consideration. In order to evaluate the actual
degree of competition between trading venues, the empirical framework must be able to
deal with eventual segmentation of the market.
Network e¤ects do not constitute the only barrier to trading venue competition. The
bundling of trading and of post-trading services constitute another barrier. The reason is
that even though nancial intermediaries can a priori choose between a set of competing
trading venues to execute an order, the services o¤ered by each venue can not actually
be considered real substitutes or fungible as di¤erent trading venues may imply di¤erent
settlement arrangements.
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Consider, as an illustration, a nancial intermediary with an order to trade Royal
Dutch securities. The intermediary can execute the order on a set of alternative venues
from Euronext Amsterdam to Deutsche Borse. However because post-trading services
are typically bundled with trading services, when the intermediary chooses a venue, she
is implicit choosing also the corresponding post-trading provider.
Table III presents the trading venues and associated central securities depositories
for Royal Dutch securities. In this illustration, only the securities trading in Euronext
Amsterdam, London Stock Exchange and Chi-X are fully fungible as they settle in the
same CSD - Euroclear Amsterdam. Trading Royal Dutch in Virt-X or Deutsche Borse
may imply settlements across di¤erent CSD with associated higher costs. Carvalho
(2004) concludes that the costs of clearing and settlement across di¤erent CSD within
Europe are 42% higher than if using the same CSD. As a result, venues that settle in
the same CSD have an advantage when compared with those that settle in di¤erent
CSD. This advantage may imply the choice for a venue that does not a priori o¤er the
best execution fee. In sum, there can not be real competition between trading venues if
nancial intermediaries can not freely choose post-trading arrangements.
In the discussion above, I present arguments that sustain that barriers to venue
competition may exist even after MiFID. As a last note, I would like to point that if
actual competition can have a extremely positive e¤ect, it may also have a negative
one: a fragmentation e¤ect. When di¤erent trading venues coexist, markets become
fragmented and the liquidity available in any one setting is reduced, thereby potentially
limiting any markets ability to provide stable prices. The bid-ask spreads might be
greater and daily securities returns might have a larger variance. Moreover, as liquidity
facilitates the crucial price discovery role of markets, as order ow fragments, the ability
of prices to aggregate information can be reduced, and with it the e¢ ciency of the
market.
MiFID addresses this point by requiring every venue not only to publish the price,
volume and time of a transaction as close to real-time as possible, but also to do it in a
way that is easily accessible to other market participants. Furthermore, it also consol-
idates the hitherto fragmented market of European over-the-counter (OTC) securities.
For these reasons, the fragmentation issues of increased trading venue competition may
be less signicant for MiFID.
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Table III - Royal Dutch Trading and Pos-Trading (Venue/CSD)
Venue Central Securities Depository
Euronext Amsterdam Euroclear Amsterdam
London Stock Exchange Euroclear Amsterdam
Chi-X Euroclear Amsterdam
Virt-X Euroclear Bank
Deutsche Borse Clearstream Banking Frankfurt
Source: Misra (2007).
3 RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature on market dominance begins with Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Rein-
ganum (1983) who show that a monopolist can maintain her dominance due to stronger
incentives for preemptive innovation. Other contributions include Budd, Harris and
Vickers (1993), Cabral and Riordan (1984), Athey and Schmutzler (2001) and Cabral
(2002). Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993) analyze the dynamics of market structure in
a duopoly and, in particular, in what circumstances we may see a process of increasing
dominance sourced on higher levels of technology. Cabral and Riordan (1984) investi-
gate another source of eventual market dominance, the hypothesis that due to a learning
curve, unit costs may decline with cumulative production. Athey and Schmutzler (2001)
model an oligopolistic setting to examine conditions under which dominance sourced in
ongoing investment may emerge. Cabral (2002) considers a similar setting but where
rms choose the amount of resources to invest and how to allocate those resources.
This paper analyzes market dominance sourced on (a) network e¤ects and (b) trading
and post-trading bundling. The literature on network e¤ects begins with Katz and
Shapiro (1985) and from then on it has developed along two di¤erent directions. Katz
and Shapiro (1994), Economides (1996), Shy (2001), and Farrell and Klemperer (2006)
provide an excellent overview of this literature. One of the strands of the literature
tries to empirically measure the e¤ect of network e¤ects, whereas the other studies its
implications. In what concerns the second source of market dominance, competition
between trading and post-trading services has been modelled by Tapking and Yang
(2004) and Koppl and Monnet (2003). The former studies di¤erent forms of industry
structures between venues and post-trading rms, whereas the latter analyzes the impact
of integrating the two services.
A number of papers have explicitly studied venue competition. The seminal work
is from Hamilton (1979) who establishes the two opposite e¤ects of multi-venue trading
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and reports empirical estimates of the e¤ect of o¤-boarding trading on liquidity and
volatility of NYSE stocks. Multi-venue trading promotes lower explicit trading costs via
higher competition but also has a fragmentation e¤ect. When di¤erent trading venues
coexist, markets become fragmented and the liquidity available in any one setting is
reduced, thereby potentially limiting any markets ability to provide stable prices. The
bid-ask spreads might be greater and daily securities returns might have a larger variance.
Moreover, as liquidity facilitates the crucial price discovery role of markets, as order ow
fragments, the ability of prices to aggregate information can be reduced, and with it
the e¢ ciency of the market. Hamilton nds that the competitive e¤ect exceeds the
fragmentation e¤ect, and that both e¤ects are small.
In general, followers of Hamiltons legacy use a reduced-form strategy that regress
spreads and liquidity on stock and market characteristics that include a competition
variable. More recent examples include Weston (2002) and Gresse (2006). Weston
(2002) investigates whether the shift towards electronic communication networks leads
to tighter bid-ask spreads and greater depths. He nds that this particular competition
has a signicant negative impact on bid-ask spreads, but no signicant impact on quoted
depth. Gresse (2006) studies the impact of crossing networks on the liquidity of the dealer
market segment of the London Stock Exchange (SEAQ). She nds that spreads decrease
due to competition but no fragmentation e¤ect is detected.
In parallel to the above approach, the literature has also evolved towards more struc-
tural and micro-founded strategies of modelling nancial markets of which Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2004) and Cantillon and Ying (2007) are some recent examples. Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2004) investigate the role that nonportfolio fund di¤erentiation and informa-
tion/search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry:
the large number of funds and the sizable dispersion in fund fees. Cantillon and Ying
(2007) study the determinants of the dynamics of the market for the future on the Bund.
I propose to estimate a structural discrete-choice demand model for trading following
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) that tries to reconcile the advantages of Hamilton
(1979)s approach with the desirable features of a micro-founded model, taking into
account two eventual barriers to competition, network e¤ects as well as the bundle of
trading and post-trading services.
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4 DEMAND FOR TRADING
The trading decision can be decomposed in two stages. First, investors decide the order
characteristics and send it to an nancial intermediaries to be executed. Second, after
receiving the order the intermediary decides the trading venue where to execute it,
conditional on the order characteristics received. In this paper, I take the rst stage
as given and propose to model the second stage choice by nancial intermediaries. An
interesting and natural extension will be the incorporation of the rst-stage into the
model framework.
Consider that in period t = 1; : : : ; T an investor sends an order with characteristics
k (including e.g. the code of the security, the direction and the volume to be traded)
to nancial intermediary i = 1; : : : ; I for her to execute. After receiving the order, the
nancial intermediary has choose the trading venue where to execute the order subject
to her internal best execution policy that had, under MiFID, to have been previously
accepted by the investor.
The best execution policy denes the intermediarys commitment towards the in-
vestor to achieve the best possible result for their clients taking into account price,
costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consider-
ation relevant to the execution of the order. An alternative view for the intermediarys
best execution policy is to think of it as an auction where the intermediary allocates the
order across the alternative trading venues according to an allocation rule known to the
investor but unknown to the econometrician.
I propose to estimate the allocation rule by specifying a structural multinomial
random-coe¢ cients logit discrete-choice demand model for trading following Berry, Levin-
sohn, and Pakes (1995) where in each period t heterogeneous nancial intermediaries i
consider to execute an order with characteristics k in a trading venue v = 0; 1; : : : ; V;
where v = 0 denotes the outside option of executing the order over-the-counter.
I model nancial intermediaries as making myopic decisions or equivalently to have
static expectations about the future based on the fact that the best execution policy
has to be applied on a trade by trade case. I therefore assume the conditional indirect
utility that nancial intermediary i obtains from executing an order of characteristics k
at venue v in period t to be of the form
uikvt (pikvt; wvkt; i) = u
 (pikvt; wkvt; i) + "ikvt; (1)
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where wkvt represents a vector of attributes for the order, venue and time period, and
pikvt denotes the all-in explicit trading costs faced by the nancial intermediary, which
include execution, clearing and settlement fees. Because the fees schedules are typically
a function of intermediary is trading prole1 during a certain time period as well as
of subset of order characteristics, the explicit trading costs pikvt are indexed by i and
k: In order to explicitly illustrate the non-linearity of the fees schedules, I will denote
pikvt = pvt (zi; k), where zi expresses the intermediary is trading prole. Lastly, nancial
intermediaries heterogeneity in their allocation rule for trading venues enters the condi-
tional indirect utility through intermediary-specic valuation i of the di¤erent elements
included in the best execution policy and an additive preference shock "ikvt:
Among the attributes of a trading venue, wkvt; that impact the choice of interme-
diaries are the implicit trading costs bkvt as cash trading exhibits network e¤ects and
participants value liquidity. Although there is no uncontroversial denition of liquid-
ity, the negative correlation between liquidity and implicit trading costs is generally
accepted. A large installed base of intermediaries trading at venue v promotes lower
implicit trading costs as it (a) stabilizes the market price of a security, and (b) reduces
the extent to which placing an order has an adverse e¤ect on the corresponding price.
As a side note, these network e¤ects can be articially reinforced by fees schedules that
are decreasing in trade volume.
Following Davis (2006) and Chen et al. (2007), u () is assumed to be of the form
u (pikvt; wkvt; i) =  ipvt (zi; k)  ibkvt + x
0
kvti + kvt; (2)
where:
(a) the vector of characteristics wkvt is split between the implicit trading costs bkvt;
a K-dimensional vector of observables, xkvt, and a vector of unobserved (to the
econometrician) characteristics, whose mean valuation for orders with character-
istics k executed in venue v in period t across nancial intermediaries is given by
kvt;
(b) The increasing function ibkvt captures the network e¤ects, where i  0 is the
parameter that controls the strength of those network e¤ects;
(c) and i denotes the parameters of estimation: i = (i; i; i)
0 :
1Volume discounts can reect venue economies of scale that are passed to agents.
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For completeness, the nancial intermediary can also choose to execute the order
over-the-counter. The conditional indirect utility from the outside option is assumed to
be uik0t = k0t+"ik0t: Following the literature, I will normalize without loss of generality
k0t = 0 as due to the ordinality of utility, only kvt  k0t matters for the intermediarys
choice of venue.
The parameters of estimation i, i and i are indexed by intermediary in order to
capture the fact that the valuations of the di¤erent elements in the allocation rule can
depend on intermediariescharacteristics. In particular, I will allow those parameters to
be a function of the intermediariestrading proles zi0B@ ii
i
1CA =
0B@ 0

1CA+ ozi; (3)
where o denote coe¢ cients that will express the heterogeneity of intermediaries in ref-
erence with their trading prole. As a result, the parameters to be estimated reduce to
 = (; ; o)0 :
After substituting equation (3) into the conditional indirect utility function (1), it is
possible to summarize the nancial intermediarys conditional indirect utility as a sum of
two terms: a rst term that is common across intermediaries, kvt =  bkvt+x0kvt+kvt,
and a second term, ikvt + "ikvt; that introduces intermediary heterogeneity
uikvt = kvt + ikvt + "ikvt; (4)
where
ikvt =
h
pvt (zi; k) ; bkvt; x
0
kvt
i
ozi:
As pijvt will typically vary by the nancial intermediarys trading prole, so will
ijvt: Following European Commission (2006), the following prole could be considered:
(a) typical volume and value tradesintermediary, (b) large volume of low value trades
intermediary, (c) large volume of high value tradesintermediary, and (d) small volume
of low value tradesintermediary.
Given the heterogeneity of the nancial intermediaries specied in the model, the
solution to the maximization problem of the indirect conditional utility over all the
di¤erent venues will vary from one intermediary to another, depending on their specic
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attributes (zi; "ikt) where "ikt = ("ik0t; : : : ; "ikV t). As a result, conditional on the order
characteristics, the set of nancial intermediaries that execute the order to trade at venue
v in period t is then
Akvt (xt; pt; t; ) = f(zi; "ik0t; : : : ; "ikV t) juikvt > uikgt8g s.t. v 6= gg ; (5)
where xt; pt and t are the vectors of observed characteristics, explicit trading costs
and deltas. If the preference shock "ikvt follows an i.i.d. extreme value distribution, the
probability that intermediary i opts for venue v to execute order with characteristics k
in period t is then given by the following multinomial logit type expression
Pikvt (xt; pt; t; ; k) =
ekvt+ikvt
1 +
P
q e
kqt+ikqt
: (6)
Integrating over the distribution of intermediariesspecic attributes and order char-
acteristics (zi; k) yields market-level share for venue v in each period t
svt (xt; pt; t; ) =
Z
Avt
ekvt+ikvt
1 +
P
q e
kqt+ikqt
dP  (z; k) ; (7)
where P  (z; k) denotes the population joint distribution function of the intermediary
types and order characteristics (zi; k), not necessarily independent.
4.1 Identication and Estimation Procedure
I now proceed with a description of the procedure to estimate the parameter vector  =
(; ; o)0 : The data available to the researcher is crucial for the estimation procedure. In
what follows, I will assume that a know joint distribution of the intermediary types and
order characteristics is available. However, the procedure can easily be modied for the
case where that distribution is unavailable and one distribution needs to be assumed,
incorporating into the utility specication its unknown parameters, to be estimated
jointly with the other parameters of the model.
The estimation algorithm encompasses four steps that I now describe.
Step One Set initial values for the mean utilities, t, and for the parameters of
estimation, .
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Step Two Approximate the predicted market-level shares. The key di¢ culty with
the random-coe¢ cients multinomial logit model has to do with the fact that no closed
form expression exists for the integral that denes those predicted shares
svt (xt; pt; t; ) =
Z
Avt
ekvt+ikvt
1 +
P
q e
kqt+ikqt
dP  (z; k) : (8)
As the computation of the above expression is, in general, problematic, the literature
follows Pakes (1986), Pakes and Pollard (1989), and McFadden (1989) and approxi-
mates that intractable integral by a simulation estimator. In what the particular choice
of the simulation estimator is concerned, the smooth simulator has been the prevailing
approach. To compute it, ns pseudo-random vectors of unobserved intermediary at-
tributes (zr1; : : : ; z
r
ns) and order characteristics (k
r
1; : : : ; k
r
ns) are drawn from dP
 (z; k),
and, given the initial values of t and ; used to obtain kvt + rikvt where
rikvt =  pvt (zri ; kr) +
h
bkvt; x
0
kvt
i
ozri : (9)
The smooth estimator that simulates the aggregate market shares is, then, given by
svt (xt; pt; t; ; P
ns) =
1
ns
nsX
i=1
ekvt+
r
ikvt
1 +
P
q e
kqt+
r
ikqt
; (10)
where Pns denotes the empirical distribution of the simulation draws. Please note that
this estimator, in contrast with other simulation estimators2, by integrating the "s
analytically, circumvents the need to draw them and, consequently, limits the simulation
error to the sampling process. It is also instrumental in obtaining simulated market-level
shares that are smooth functions, positive and sum to one.
As a nal note I would like to stress, as Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) point out,
that the introduction of simulation error inuences the asymptotic distribution of the
estimator and, therefore, needs to be explicitly taken it account. On this subject please
see step four below.
Step Three Estimate the econometric error, jvt, as a function of the parameters
of estimation . The mean utility jvt can not be solved for analytically, but Berry,
2Please see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) for a detailed survey on the optimal importance
sampling simulator, and the appendix to Nevo (2000) for an analysis on the naive frequency estimator.
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Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) proved that, for a given , the mapping of values of jvt
into themselves is a contraction mapping with modulus less than one, and therefore that
it is possible to solve for the unique jvt that matches the simulated market-level shares,
sjvt (x; pt; t; ; P
ns) with the observed ones, snjvt; for all j and t, recursively,
kjvt () = 
k 1
jvt () + ln

snjvt
  ln hsjvt xt; pt; k 1t ; ; Pnsi ; (11)
as the iterations converge geometrically to the unique xed point, where the simulated
market-level shares sjvt (xt; pt; t; ; Pns) have to be computed at every new iterated kt :
Denote the xed point by jvt (snt ; ; P
ns) where snt represents the vector of observed
aggregate market shares.
Given the unique xed point, it is relatively straithforward to obtain an estimate of
the econometric error as a function of the data, x; pt; st; the parameters of estimation,
; and the simulation process, Pns;
jvt (s
n
t ; ; P
ns) = jvt (s
n
t ; ; P
ns) +  (bjvt)  x0jvt: (12)
Step Four Estimate the parameters : Typically, the estimation procedure relies
on an identifying restriction over the distribution of the true econometric error, obtained
by evaluating equation (12) at n = ns =1; that is, jvt (s1t ; ; P1) :
An econometric issue with the above estimation procedure relates to an eventual
correlation between trading costs and the econometric error term. This correlation is
expected as trading costs typically incorporate some information that the econometrician
does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Due to this
eventual correlation, instrumental variables techniques are, therefore, required. I assume,
however, as it is standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean
independent of the observed ones (please see Berry, 1994).
I follow the literature and aim to identify the parameters of the model by applying
GMM to the below population moment condition,
E

jvt (s
1
t ; ; P
1) jZjt

= 0; (13)
where jvt denotes the unobserved (to the econometrician) valuation of instrument j at
venue v in period t. Please note that other identifying restrictions would also enable
the estimation of the model. In particular, given the typical panel structure of the data,
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an alternative assumption could incorporate the likelihood of the econometric error and
the set of instruments to be more similar for a given brand across time, than for those
of di¤erent brands. Please see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Davis (2006) for
a more detailed analysis on this subject.
The above population moment conditions can be used, akin to Hansen (1982), to
render a method of moments estimator of ; by interacting the estimated econometric
error with the set of instruments, and search for the value of the parameters, , that
set the sample analogues of the moment conditions as closed as possible to zero. Let
Gn;ns () denote the sample analogues of the moment conditions,
Gn;ns () =
1
n
TX
t=1
VX
v=1
JvtX
j=1
jvt (s
n
t ; ; P
ns)Zjvt =
1
n
X
t;v;j
 () : (14)
Formally, the method of moments estimator, ^; is therefore the argument that mini-
mizes the weighted norm criterion of Gn;ns () ; for some weighting matrix An with rank
at least equal to the dimension of ,
^ = argmin

kGn;ns ()kAn = Gn;ns ()
0AnGn;ns () : (15)
The strong non-linearity of the objective function requires a minimization routine.
The standard practice in the literature has been to use either the Nelder-Mead (1965)
nonderivative "simplex" search method or a quasi-Newton method with an analytic
gradient (see Press at al., 1994). The latter has the important (computational) advantage
of being two orders of magnitude faster than the former. However, because the rst
method is more robust and less sensitive to starting values, I will perform the search
using the Nelder-Mead (1965) nonderivative "simplex" search.
The non-linear search over  can be simplied by making use of the fact that the rst
order conditions for a minimum of kGn;ns ()kAn are linear for the subset 1 = (; )
of the parameters of estimation,  = (1; u) : Consequently, it is possible, given the
standard instrumental variables results, to express 1 as function of u; and limit the
non-linear search over u;
1 =
 
Q0ZA 1n Z
0Q
 1
Q0ZA 1n Z
0 (u) : (16)
where Q denotes the matrix of trading costs and observed characteristics; Z denotes the
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matrix of instruments; and, nally,  denotes the matrix of mean utilities; expressed only
in terms of u after concentrating out 1:
5 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
5.1 Data Description
I apply the model outlined above to a set of 16 of the most traded securities in the FTSE
100 following the list of liquid securities published (and updated regularly) by CESR
after the implementation of MiFID. Information on those securities was obtained for the
top trading venues following the REUTERS Market Shares Reports. I followed Pinkse
and Slade (2004) in what the criterion of which venues to include in the sample was
concerned, and included those that accounted for at least one percent of the market in
volume: the London Stock Exchange, Chi-X and the systematic internalizers aggregated
in Markit Boat.
For each security and trading venue, daily information was collected from DATAS-
TREAM on the o¢ cial price, the ask and bid prices, the number of trades, and the
number of shares traded. For both Chi-X and the systematic internalizers aggregated in
Markit Boat information on the number of trades and the number of shares traded was
obtained directly.
Market size was assumed to be the total number of shares traded per security across
all possible trading venues and was collected via DATASTREAM. Trading venue market
shares were then computed as the ratio of the corresponding number of shares traded
over market size.
Information on execution, settlement and clearing fees was obtained directly via the
published fee schedules. In what concerns the systematic internalizers in Markit Boat,
these information was obtained from JP Morgan MiFID Report II that discriminates
the average execution, settlement and clearing costs of a systematic internalizer. Given
that typically (although not always) those fee schedules are a function of each nancial
intermediary trading prole in what concerns the volume and value, I considered the
fees that would arise for the four intermediarys types in European Commission (2006):
(a) typical volume and value tradesintermediary, (b) large volume of low value trades
intermediary, (c) large volume of high value tradesintermediary, and (d) small volume
of low value tradesintermediary.
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Table IV - Summary Statistics
Variable Venue Mean Std Min Max
CHX 0:03 0:03 0:00 0:14
Market Share LSE 0:70 0:06 0:47 0:92
SI 0:04 0:03 0:00 0:19
CHX 13:14 10:05 1:50 40:87
Price (£ ) LSE 13:14 10:05 1:49 40:90
SI 13:06 9:97 1:50 40:90
CHX 0:09 0:56 0:00 6:87
E¤ective Spread (£ ) LSE 0:05 0:02 0:00 0:30
SI 0:06 0:11 0:00 0:77
CHX 1:36 1:22 0:20 5:30
Volume per trade (000 shares) LSE 3:75 4:24 0:39 26:70
SI 42:67 78:75 0:25 852:04
In what the implicit trading costs is concerned, e¤ective spreads were computed.
The e¤ective spread is dened as the di¤erence between the transaction price and the
current mid-quote for time period t) ,
esjt = jPjt  Mjtj ; (17)
where Mjt is the quote mid-point, i.e. (Ajd + Bjd)=2; Ajt denotes the ask price, Bjt
the bid price, and Pjt the e¤ective transaction price of instrument j in period t. This
measure takes into account the fact that trades can occur either inside or outside the
quoted spread. Therefore, it incorporates both the impacts of market spreads and market
impact on trading costs, even if it does not allow the separation of the two e¤ects.
Microstructure literature has shown that the e¤ective spread reects expected losses to
informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom(1985), Copeland and Galai (1983)), inventory
costs (Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981)) and order
processing costs (Stoll (1985)).
I follow Stoll (2000) and Jain (2001) and median the di¤erent variables at a weekly
frequency to reduce measurement errors due to random daily uctuations.
Table IV presents some general statistics for the resulting dataset ranging from the
rst week of November 2007 to the last week of March 2008. Several interesting trends
are evident. The incumbent venue - LSE - clearly dominates the industry with an average
market share of 70% - against 3%-4% for each of the competing venues. There is no
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Figure IV - Decomposition of Total Fees per Trade
signicant di¤erence in the price securities are traded, but the bid-ask spread is clearly
lower at LSE with an average e¤ective spread of $0:005 against $0:06-$0:09 on the
competing venues. The statistics on the volume per trade suggest a clear segmentation of
the industry, with the di¤erent venues attracting distinct type of orders. Chi-X attracts
the lowest average volume per trade, the SI attract the highest average volume per trade,
and LSE positions itself between those two. As there is no signicant di¤erence in the
price securities are traded, the heterogeneity in volume per trade carries to the turnover
per trade.
The total fees are a function of each nancial intermediary trading prole in what
concerns the volume and value. For this reason they are not presented in the summary
statistics table. For illustration purposes, Figure IV plots the total fees (and correspond-
ing decomposition) that would arise for the typical nancial intermediary following the
European Commission (2006) classication. It is clear that Chi-X o¤ers the lowest ex-
ecution fee, but its competitiveness is penalized due to high clearing and settlement
fees.
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5.2 Demand Identication
Total fees are typically set taking into account some information that the researcher does
not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Furthermore,
e¤ective spreads are the outcome of unobserved information to the researcher. As a
result, those fees and spreads are expected to be correlated with the error term and
instrumental variables techniques are required. The use of securities- and venue specic
dummy variables decreases the requirements on the instruments needed for a consistent
estimation. However, it does not eliminate completely the need for them, as both fees
and spreads are likely to still be correlated with unobserved time-specic deviations from
the overall mean valuations.
In the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) I use lag
liquidity values as instruments for both total fees and e¤ective spreads under the as-
sumption that those lags are uncorrelated with the error term and, at the same time,
correlated with the endogenous variables that needs instrumenting. Please see the en-
dogenous liquidity section for more details.
5.3 Demand Function Estimates
The rst set of results, presented in Table V, correspond to the random-coe¢ cients
multinomial logit demand model. The demand specication includes total fees and
e¤ective spread variables as observed attributes whereas unobserved attributes were
partly taken into account by the inclusion of security, venue and week dummy variables.
The log transformation of the total fees variable was used to reduce skeweness.
The coe¢ cients on fees and liquidity are allowed to be intermediary specic in order
to capture the fact that the valuations of the di¤erent elements in the allocation rule can
depend on intermediariescharacteristics. In particular, I will allow those parameters to
be a function of the intermediariestrading proles zi0B@ ii
i
1CA =
0B@ 0

1CA+ ozei =
0B@ 0

1CA+oi +vi; (18)
where oi is a denotes the log transformation of order size from intermediary i - drawn3
from the Chi-X, LSE and SI order books, vi is a 3 1 vector of random-variables drawn
3 I sampled 500 intermediaries per week and security.
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Table V
Results from Full Modela
Means
Standard
Deviations
Interactions with
log (Order Size)
Variable (,s)  
Constant 0.666 0.000 -0.096
(0.165) (0.006) (0.001)
log (total fees)  0.000 -0.017
 (0.000) (0.021)
E¤ective Spread 1.552 0.357 -1.109
(0.128) (0.001) (0.000)
Chi-X dummy -1.429  
(0.098)  
SI dummy -1.320  
(0.099)  
a Regression based on 1008 observations. Security, venue and week dummy variables
are included as controls.Asymptotically standard errors in parentheses.
from a normalized multivariate normal distribution,  is a 3  1 matrix of order size
coe¢ cients, and  is a 3 3 diagonal matrix that scales the e¤ect of vi.
Table V reports the estimated GMM results. The rst column reports the estimates
of the di¤erent coe¢ cients means, whereas the other columns present estimates of their
heterogeneity.
The results suggest that the coe¢ cients are of the expected sign with market shares
reacting negatively to total fees and liquidity as we can infer from the corresponding
predicted distribution of the institution-specic valuations plotted in Figure V. Most
of the heterogeneity is due to order sizes as the magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the
unobserved intermediary characteristics (vi) are of a small magnitude. Furthermore,
intermediaries with higher order sizes tend to be more sensitive to both fees and liquidity.
In order to evaluate the impact of both fees and spreads on market shares, own-
and cross-price elasticities were computed for both variables. Table VI reports those
estimated elasticities computed according to the estimates in Table V.
In the top part of the table, the results suggest that all venues enjoy a certain
degree of market power as intermediaries tend to have a low price sensitivity - for the
given set of bid-ask spreads in the market. A one percent decrease in the total fees of
the venues are estimated to impact only marginally the respective market shares. A
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Figure V
Frequency Distribution for Total Fees Coefficient
Frequency Distribution for Liquidity Coefficient
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Table VI - Median estimated Elasticitiesa
CHX LSE SI
Market share with respect to Total Fees
CHX -0.069 0.067 0.003
LSE 0.001 -0.021 0.002
SI 0.001 0.037 -0.067
Market share with respect to E¤ective Spread
CHX -2.877 0.031 0.001
LSE 0.000 -0.891 0.000
SI 0.002 0.042 -2.812
a The elasticity in a cell gives the percent change in market share of the rows
venue with a one percent change in the variable of the columns venue.
possible justication may lie on the network e¤ects that characterize the industry. As
intermediaries value both low cost and high liquidity, a decrease in the total fees of a
given venue may not be su¢ cient to induce a change of venue.
In the bottom part of the table, the results point to the important role of liquidity on
the choice of venue. For the given set of total fees in the market, a one percent increase
in the e¤ective spread of CHX or SI is estimated to decrease the corresponding market
share by around 3%. The result is intuitive as intermediaries are willing to trade-o¤
lower liquidity for lower total fees - if that liquidity decreases, then we would expect to
see a high number of intermediaries switching towards a lower cost venue.
In sum, the results seem to suggest a greater importance of liquidity in comparison
with total fees when deciding the venue where to route a given order.
5.3.1 Endogenous Liquidity
Liquidity and fees are clearly not exogenous relatively to each other - one would expect
venues to take into consideration liquidity when setting fees, as well as liquidity to
be a funtion of the fees schedules. Given the highly endogenous nature of liquidity, a
modelling of such outcome is required. Micro-nance theory implies that liquidity may
be potentially a non-linear function of a series of factors that a¤ect both the demand
and supply for trading. I follow Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) and introduce a reduce-
form approach that estimates a liquidity equation as a function of those factors. These
include, in line with Stoll (2000), Wahal (1997) and Weston (2002), venue market share,
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Table VII
Liquidity Equationa
Explanatory Variable
E¤ective
Spread
Market Share
CHX -3.645 (1.092)
LSE -1.271 (0.378)
SI -4.512 (1.142)
log (volume) 0.019 (0.005)
Price 0.006 (0.001)
Volatility 1.886 (0.165)
Unobserved Characteristics
CHX 0.274 (0.069)
LSE 0.688 (0.340)
SI 0.187 (0.063)
R2 0.350
a Regression based on 1008 observations.
Standard errors in parentheses.
share volume, price, and share volatility4. In addition demand side estimates were also
exploited to include unobserved venue characteristics, computed as follows,
kvt = kvt + bkvt   x
0
kvt; (19)
where kvt, and  were obtained at the demand estimation stage.
Table VII presents the IV results of the liquidity equation regression5. The coe¢ -
cients are mostly of the expected sign with an increase in the market share lowering the
e¤ective spread, while an increase in price and volatility are associated with an increase
in spreads.
The liquidity equation is instrumental in understanding the impact of total fees on
e¤ective spreads as total fees inuence relative market shares which in turn determine
venue liquidity. In order to evaluate the total impact impact of fees on spreads, own-
4Share volatility is dened, following Ding and Charoenwong (2003), as the standard deviation over
the average of the quoted mid-point within each time period,
SVjt =
sd [Mjd]
mean [Mjd]
;
where sd [] represents the standard deviation taken over the days included in period t.
5Log transformation of the volume variable was used to reduce skewness.
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Table VIII - Median estimated Elasticitiesa
CHX LSE SI
E¤ective Spread with respect to Total Fees
CHX 0.351 -0.342 -0.018
LSE -0.221 3.766 -0.391
SI -0.009 -0.304 0.558
a The elasticity in a cell gives the percent change in the liquidity of the rows
venue with a one percent change in the total fees of the columns venue.
and cross-price median elasticities were computed as follows,
@bkvt
@pqt
pqt
bkvt
=
@bkvt
@skvt
"pvq
skvt
bkvt
; (20)
where "pvq denotes the cross-total fees elasticity between venues v and q. Table VIII
reports the estimated elasticities.
6 Barriers to Competition
After estimating the degree of substitutability between the di¤erent trading venues, I
address the question of evaluation the barriers to competition induced by the network
e¤ects and the post-trading constraints.
6.1 Network E¤ects
In order to analyze the impact of network e¤ects as a barrier to competition, I propose
to compute the counterfactual market shares that would arise if there were no liquidity
di¤erences across venues (although still allowing for heterogeneity across the securities
traded). In particular, I considered the case where the e¤ective spread for each security-
week pair is the same across venues and equal to the median of the actual observed
spreads. The results - presented in Table IX - suggest that eliminating the liquidity
advantage of the incumbent venue contributes to a less assymetric industry. Chi-X would
benet less than the SI because of the disadvantage from a post-trading perspective - a
point I address in the next sub-section.
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Table IX - Liquidity as a Barrier
Medians
Current
Market Shares
Counterfactual
Market Shares
CHX 0.021 0.094
LSE 0.703 0.426
SI 0.037 0.118
6.2 Post-Trading Constraints
The competitiveness of a given venue can be penalized by higher post-trading costs. I
propose to evaluate the barriers to competition induced by post-trading constraints by
simulating the equilibrium market shares that would arise if the securities traded in the
di¤erent trading venues were fungible and intermediaries could choose the post-trading
arrangements with the lowest clearing and settlement fees.
Being allowed to freely choose post-trading arrangements is equivalent to an e¤ective
decrease in the total fees paid by some intermediaries (those that switch from current
arrangements).
A decrease in the total fees has a direct impact on relative markets shares and
consequently on e¤ective spreads which in turn also inuence market shares. Table X
presents the counterfactual results, descriminating the di¤erent e¤ects that would arise.
Conditional on the maintenance of the same level of clearing and settlement fees
after eliminating the post-trading constraints, the results suggest that eliminating the
post-trading constraints and allowing intermediaries to choose the most competitive
post-trading arrangements would also induce less asymmetric industry - of the same
order of magnitude as of eliminating the network e¤ect.
7 CONCLUSION
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) aims to increase competition
and to foster client protection in the European nancial market. Among other provisions,
it abolishes the concentration rule and challenges the market power of existing trading
venues.
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Table X - Post-Trading as a Barrier
Medians
Current Counterfactual
Market Shares E¤. Spreads
Direct Impact
Market Shares
Direct Impact
E¤. Spreads
Total Impact
Market Shares
CHX 0.021 0.015 0.022 0.009 0.094
LSE 0.703 0.005 0.702 0.006 0.445
SI 0.037 0.020 0.037 0.020 0.107
The directive introduces venue competition in order to achieve better execution and
ultimately lower costs of trading. However, the fostering venue competition may not be
enough. In this paper I address the question of whether fostering competition between
alternative trading venues alone may or not be able to impact actual competition in
the market. I consider two reasons for why it may not: direct network e¤ects and
post-trading constraints.
I empirically address the following questions: (a) evaluate the actual degree of compe-
tition between trading venues, (b) measure the impact of network e¤ects on competition,
and lastly (c) assess the barriers to competition induced by the bundle of trading and
post-trading services.
The results imply that nancial intermediaries tend to value liquidity more (than
total fees) when deciding where to route a given order for execution. For this reason the
incumbent venue has a clear advantage relatively to its competitors and can, as a result,
exert market power when setting total fees. Furthermore, eliminating the mentioned
barriers to competition seems to be asociated with a signicant decrease (of a similar
magnitude) in the assymetry of the industry.
It is known that in general competition impacts economic growth via a more e¢ -
cient allocation of market resources that contributes to better economic performance,
better prices and better services for consumers and businesses(Kroes (2007)). This
paper argues that fostering potential competition in the cash trading market may not
have an impact on the degree of actual competition as both direct network e¤ects and
post-trading constraints act as barries to actual competition. The results presented
here indicate that policies promoting competition on the post-trading after market is
instrumental in boosting the e¤ectiveness of MiFID.
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APPENDIX - DATA
Table A(I)
Securities Used in Demand Estimation
Anglo American
Barclays
BG
BHP Billiton
BP
Glaxosmithkline
HBOS
HSBC
Lloyds TSB
Prudential
Reckitt Benckiser
Royal Dutch Shell B
Standard Chartered
Tesco
Vodafone
Xstrata
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